ANDREW MWENDA

Moderator: Patrick, could you please make him a speaker? Patrick: Sure. Agather Atuhaire: Okay. Hi, everyone. Good evening to all of you joining us on this space. Apologies for the slight delay; we wanted to wait for everyone to gather, and of course, for our speakers. I see Andrew is here. We haven’t heard from Honorable Wynne yet—she mentioned she was traveling, but she hoped to join us once she arrived. For everyone else, feel free to jump in later when we open the floor for comments or questions. I’m Agather Atuhaire , and I’m happy to be back on the Agora Discourse after a while—Godwin held the fort in my absence. Today, we’re talking about political transition. Lately, we’ve seen a lot of buzz around what happens next after President Museveni, or if there will even be a post-Museveni era, though we all know it’s inevitable. We’ve seen figures like General Muhoozi Kainerugaba, the CDF, pull back on his earlier presidential bid, stating President Museveni will likely be on the ballot again in 2026. Not a huge surprise there. There’s also been talk about electoral reform, and some plans to have parliament elect the president. For context—though I’m sure most of you know this—Uganda has never had a peaceful transfer of power since independence in 1962. 

In many places, political transitions often trigger violence or chaos. Andrew, who’s here with us, often refers to Libya as an example, and we’re all aware of what’s happening in other African nations like Zimbabwe and Sudan. When President Museveni came to power in 1986, he spoke of a “fundamental change” and initially promised to lead for just four years before handing power to civilians. That, of course, didn’t happen. We got a constitution, and it included term limits to address transition issues. Term limits were removed in 2005, and the presidential age limit followed in 2017. Since then, uncertainty around Museveni’s exit has only grown. President Museveni recently celebrated his 80th birthday, and every day it becomes more evident that his tenure might be nearing its end. He’s hinted at it himself. We’ve also seen his son, still a serving UPDF officer, make moves with a political outfit, which Andrew Mwenda, who’s with us, represents. His son has talked about succeeding his father but has since backtracked on those comments. With all this in mind, Andrew, I’ll bring you in at this point. How do you see the political transition playing out in Uganda from where you stand? 

Andrew Mwenda: Thank you so much, Agather, for inviting me. I’m not so sure what you are asking me about and in what capacity, whether you’re asking me as an analyst or you’re asking me as spokesperson for PLU, which has literally been disbanded. So I’ll speak real as an analyst because that is what I consider myself to be in these things. First, I have this belief that any constitution is a piece of paper unless its provisions are rooted in the balance of power between the different social forces and individuals acting politically, and I will illustrate it this way. In 1789, when the Americans wrote their constitution, the constitution started with a clear declaration that all men are born equal and are endowed with their creator with indivisible rights such as the right to life, right to freedom and liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Although that was the aspiration or at least the presupposition of the U.S. Constitution, in the 1789 elections, only propertied white men could vote. So clearly, at that time, all men are born equal to all human beings. So women were not voting, blacks were enslaved, Native Americans were being genocided, and therefore the provisions of the constitution could not be enforced because the balance of political forces was such that only propertied white Americans, American males, could vote. Universal male suffrage was achieved 47 years later, 43 years later, in 1832. In 1865, January, they passed the American, the Emancipation Proclamation, and in 1867, they passed what they called the 15th Amendment, which said nobody should be stopped from voting on the basis of their race or previous condition of servitude. That is 1867. Up until 1965, that is 98 years later, black people couldn’t vote in most of the South. Even today, many black people are disenfranchised from voting because, and I don’t want to go into the details. I want us to understand that unless a constitution’s provisions reflect the balance of political power among the different contending forces, it as a piece of paper cannot work. Therefore, a good constitution is what we would call a self-reinforcing constitution. 

It must have strong positive incentives for incumbents to honor the provisions of the constitution and severe consequences if they fail to violate them. The problem with the 1995 constitution of Uganda is that it was a statement of our aspirations for term limits, for age limits, for so many things. But I feel like there was not sufficient political backing for them, or there wasn’t sufficient political force within Uganda and the civic and political society to enforce those provisions. So it was easy for Mr. Museveni to remove term limits, it was easy to remove age limits, but it has been easy for him and his NRA to violate or say the statement of provisions of this constitution. 

The point I want to make is that I’m not making a moral judgment, I’m just making a political analysis that any constitution, therefore, which does not express the actual balance of political forces, the political power, will be violated and have given the longest, oldest, largest democracy in the world, perhaps not the second largest democracy in the world, in the United States, the birthplace of modern democracy, that even up to now so many of its lofty aspirations have not been realized. So what do you expect from Uganda, which is such a democracy? We are saying 20 years ago, 1995, that is coming 30 years ago. So now we come to the transition in Uganda. What is the likely scenario of a transition? And I think to understand the transition in Uganda, we can’t, therefore, go to the constitution because the constitution is a statement of moral and political ideals. Our constitution is not a statement of effective, negotiated provisions that reflect the actual balance of power. If Museveni were to die tonight, God forbid, what would happen? And us as Ugandans, trying to analyze the situation, we must be very realistic. What would happen? In my own belief, in my own view, I believe that the most important institution to decide on that transition will be the military. That the first place where the meeting will take place will be the Army High Command, and UPDF will have the most important role in deciding the trajectory of how to manage the transition. 

If the Army High Command sits and they discuss and they say we need to follow the constitution, in which case they will call, inform the chief justice, inform the NRI leadership, that Jessica Alupo should take power as the constitution for 180 days as organized elections elected president. If the Army High Command decides we don’t trust the constitutional process, they can do many things under the constitution or within the constitution, but to ensure that their preference is what is implemented. Because they have effective control over the instruments of coercion, and then they can get their way. And I don’t think there’s sufficient political power within Ugandan civic and political society that would effectively defeat what the military establishment will have decided. Now, once I have said those principles, I want to go to the third element. The third element is what should we Ugandans expect? You see, in the transition, I don’t have evidence about the future. So for me to make a prediction about the future, I have to look at space and time. Look for similar scenarios and try to draw from those similar scenarios the likely outcome for Uganda. The NRI is a very distinct government. It is not a government like that of, say, Idi Amin, which you sat at night, collaborated and, what do you say, conspired, and the next day you overthrew a government. No. It’s not a government of Moi, where you came to power because a sitting president died. It’s not a government of John Kufo Addo in Ghana, who was elected. He was in the opposition and was elected. This government of Museveni is specific. It is a group of disgruntled politicians who go to the bush, take up arms, go to the bush, and from the lowest level of 27 people or 40 people launch a protracted armed struggle from below and they dismantle the state above. Those kinds of revolutionary governments or armed struggle governments, you find them in Africa, you find them in Rwanda, you find them in Ethiopia and Eritrea and Mozambique and Angola and Guinea-Bissau and Algeria. You can find them in Cuba, in Nicaragua, in Vietnam, in China and Russia. So across this geographic space and across that historic time, these movements seem to have very peculiar characteristics. Once they capture power and consolidate within five years, they never get to lose it. We don’t have that experience. We have a small experience in Nicaragua for a few years, but came back and they’re still there. The Sandinistas, that is one. Two, the founder is always the political leader, is the ideological philosopher, is also the minister-in-command. You will find it across the board. Power is always centralised in the presidency, personalised in the hands of the president. And therefore, that structure of organisation of power tends to lead itself to the argument that because power is so personalised and the survival depends on the skills of the individual president, if he dies, things will fall apart. But the historic record actually shows that we’re never a president in these revolutionary movements, whether it has been Lenin and Stalin, Chairman Mao in China, whether it has been Ho Chi Minh in Vietnam, or Fidel Castro in Cuba, or Meles Zenawi in Ethiopia, or Mondolani in Mozambique, or Agustin Neto in Angola, or Ahmed Ben Bella and later Bomedin in Algeria. There is always a peaceful transition. And normally, there is a transition from the all-powerful founding leader to the college of his peers. So you have after Stalin, you have people like Molotov, Khrushchev, Cherenkov taking over as the triumvirate. After Mao, you have Deng Xiaoping and his group. So, there is a shift of leadership from the all-powerful founding father to a college of his peers. So if you ask me, the regular possibility of Uganda, Uganda is likely to follow the same trajectory. Of course, what I’m saying, there may be exceptions, there may be a black swan, there may be divergences or even counter-narratives, but overall, I think that is the history I have seen. Revolutionary or armed struggle governments, and whereby the high command will sit after it has reached a decision, it will call the NRM CEC, the NRM CEC will reach a decision, and then that decision is what will follow. And, yeah, so if you ask me about the transition, that is what I can say. 

Moderator: Oh, thank you, Andrew. I didn’t want to keep interrupting you, so I kept writing down some things I would like to follow up on. You say PLU has been disbanded. Does General Kainerugaba saying he will not be on the ballot automatically disband PLU, or has there been any other decision to that effect? 

Andrew Mwenda: Well, maybe it’s the wrong word. PLU is a private company limited by guarantee. It’s not a political party. We could say maybe it’s a, what I would call, a pressure group. And its main aim was to promote the candidacy of General Muhoozi. Now he’s not in, he has declared he cannot run, and he has made it clear to everyone that those people who wanted to run on the ticket of PLU should join the NRM. I am sure he has communicated sufficient information to that effect that anyone can draw lessons. Okay, he may not have disbanded PLU, but he has said it will now be subordinated to the NRM. Its candidates have to run as NRM candidates, not as PLU members. Okay, so PLU has, PLU, which is a company limited by guarantee, has sort of merged with NRM, which is a political party, right? Not merged, but the lead of PLU has asked his followers to join NRM and support candidacy in NRM. So the followers of PLU could have still been in NRM, stayed in NRM, because this wasn’t a political party in the first place, from what you are saying. Actually, the followers of PLU were not just NRM. There were many PLU members who were from NUP, others from FDC, from DP, from UPC. It was a collection of all Ugandans who believe in progressive ideas, that this country needs a new generation of leaders and needs a much more competent, effective, and public-spirited government.

Moderator: Okay, so when you started us here thinking about, and I thought to myself, Andrew has a huge obsession with America, because I knew that eventually you’re going to end by saying that if America could fail to do this, what about Uganda, which was really the conclusion. But I am thinking that we have a constitution that says very clearly that in case the president dies, the vice president takes over. But in your analysis and projection, you say that the army will be the one to decide what happens. They will be the one to decide whether to follow the constitution, or whether to follow the constitution and allow Jessica Arupo, who is the current vice president, to take power, or whether to use any other means. I would like to ask why that is so, that you think the army is the most important institution to make a decision in this equation. 

Andrew Mwenda: Because of the way political power in Uganda is organized, the way it is distributed, the way it is exercised, and the way it is reproduced. Not those four things. The way political power in Uganda is organized, the way it is distributed, the way it is exercised, and the way it is reproduced. The army has a strong preponderance there. Andrew Mwenda: You can sit in the branches of utopia and imagine an ideal situation, like imagine a marriage where there is no cheating, but I think the reality of life is what I’m trying to explain. I gave an American experience because I have spent many years studying the American political system. It impressed me a lot, and looking at the challenges the Americans have faced, I am sure many democracies face similar challenges as America. Unfortunately, I’m not as well read about them, or they do not interest me as much as the United States. So the United States, one, is the oldest democracy today in the world. Two, it is the richest country in the world. Three, it is the one country that speaks most loudly about democracy, and I think it is the leader of the free world, or the democratic world. It is also the champion of promoting democracy across the whole world, and therefore the American experience provides us important lessons in understanding how a democratic polity works, or for that matter, how any policy, any polity works. And the example I drew from there is that democracy is messy, and that human institutions cannot be perfect, and what you write in law is very different from what happens in practice. Law can only be enforced when there is political capacity to do so. Take the example of international law. If you are America, you can violate international law arbitrarily. You can invade Iraq or Afghanistan or Libya. You can do anything you want. No one will restrain you. America does that because it can do it without severe repercussions. No one will impose sanctions on it. No one will economically blockade it. No one can do anything. So, to that degree, I think that if you want to study Museveni, study the way America exercises power around the world. Museveni exercises power exactly the way America does, because he does certain things because he can do them, and there are no strong countervailing political forces within Uganda to restrain his hand. So, if he wants to amend the constitution and remove term limits, he can use political bribery, he can use political persuasion, and he can use military power. So, he can buy off some, convince others, and coerce the rest. You see what I mean? That’s how power is exercised. There are three platforms of power. The rest would really be discussing utopia. And me, I don’t want to discuss religion. I want to discuss politics. 

Moderator: Okay. Let’s not discuss utopia. So, when you say that the army will effectively be the institution that makes this decision, not the constitution, as what it sets out, should we think that by President Museveni placing his son, Muhoozi Kainerugaba, at the helm of the army, this is what he was thinking about? Or, yeah, this is the scenario he was looking at? I don’t know what Museveni’s calculations are, but remember that Museveni also has a brother who is a general, General Salim Saleh, and he has a lot of influence in the military. Assuming Museveni was not there and an army high command meeting was called, the question would be, is it the CDF to chair that army high command meeting in the absence of Museveni, or is it the most senior general member of the army high command, who would be General Salim Saleh, to chair it? So, who of those two would have the decisive influence in that meeting? How would the other generals sitting in that army high command, how would they react? You can make your own conclusions from that. Perhaps, who would have greater prestige to be listened to, to guide that discussion? Whom would the generals listen to more and lean towards? Who of those would be most listened to by the NRM top leadership? Because, I told you, the army would be the most decisive factor, not the only factor. Because there are other factors, of course, without a doubt. There is the NRM as a political party. In the absence of Museveni, I believe that many of the top leaders of the NRM, its elders and the pillars like Kigongo, like Rugunda and others, their influence would also increase. What would they be thinking about? What would be their reaction to it? So, if the army’s role is 60-70%, I’m sure the NRM role may be 20-30%. So, you have about 90%. Then, perhaps, the leaders of our traditional institutions and the churches may be consulted. The judiciary may be consulted. But, whatever it is, I think that the bedrock, what do we call it, the founded matrix of the system will be held together by the military. Yes. 

Moderator: Thanks, Andrew. My knowledge of the military is not that good, so I was here wondering how is General Salim Saleh the most senior general in the army? Andrew Mwenda: I think in the high command, yes. I don’t know because the most senior person on high command would be Otafire, because M7 is RO, resistance officer 001, Otafire is 0013, or 0014, and Saleh is 016. So M7 is 001, Kategaya was 002, but all those are dead. So Otafire is the major general, Saleh is a general. And they are both in the high command. Even Jim, who has the name of the high command, the historic high command, he’s a major general. So I believe that the most senior person would be Saleh in that meeting. And he’s a senior presidential advisor, which has the same rank as the cabinet minister. But I think that in terms of military prestige, I do not know any other officer right now in that high command who would take precedence over Saleh. 

Moderator: Okay, so military prestige makes more sense. The seniority seems like something I need to cross-check before I believe that Saleh is the major general. 

Andrew Mwenda: No, because the seniority of the army is not determined by the tenure you joined, it’s determined by your rank. And I’ve told you, Otafire is the major general, Saleh is the general. 

Moderator: Before we leave the army issue, what if the army’s high command is not speaking the same language? In that, like a scenario, if President Museveni drops dead and the army, the high command is not agreeing on what next? 

Andrew Mwenda: Because, you see, in the case, it depends on what is the nature of the disagreement and what is the balance of forces. So if you are just a general without forces, you are the chief of administration and finance at the army headquarters, you may be a member of the high command and you disagree. So what? If the division commanders, the brigade commanders are willing to listen to the CDF and the chairman of high command, then your voice… But if significant factors within the army that control actual fighting men and weapons disagree, then you have what you’re seeing in South Sudan, or rather in Khartoum today, you can have a war break out. And I don’t see that as a likely scenario, given the way I know UPDF. In fact, I think that they are much more coherent than people think. So the UPDF would sit, it would go, it would get a very good debate, and their decision would be the most influential one. It would be the most convincing. Also remember, Agather, that there are three pillars of power. One is economic power, which is the power to bribe, to buy off somebody. Then there is what we call soft power, or, yes, persuasive power, the power to persuade, soft power, the power to persuade. Then there is the third form of power, which is military power, the power to coerce. Now, the thing why military always takes preponderance is that assuming you have economic power, I have military power, the other one has persuasive power, and any dispute among us is escalated. If it’s escalated to the highest level of fighting, the one with military capability will win. However convincing you may be, if I defeat you militarily, then you don’t have anything. In any case, history is written by the victors. Those who are vanquished, they may have the right cause, but then their voices may never be heard because they lost. So, to that degree, I give military, those who have effective control over the instruments of coercion and repression, I give them greater preponderance in influencing the direction Uganda will take. 

Moderator: So, you think that that type of power is stronger than the other forms that you described in Uganda’s case, right? I’m not saying they are stronger or more important. I’m simply saying that if there was a disagreement between a guy controlling the army, another one controlling a radio station, and another one controlling a bank, and that dispute is escalated to its highest level, the guy with arms will prevail. And that’s why you can have the greatest, like in international relations, let me assume America, like right now culturally, they have the most powerful instruments of mass propaganda. Their media is able to control global narratives and what we believe, what we think is right, and all this. But assuming America does not have military power at all, it had all the cultural power to influence beliefs. If any dispute was escalated with Russia or China and they have military capacity and they defeated it, then, I mean, no amount of money would stop that. The Roman Empire would collapse because it could not militarily sustain its army. You know? Any power, however rich or persuasive it may be, if it lacks the capacity to sustain itself militarily, to fend off opponents, it will be defeated and then it will cease to be a powerful nation. 

Moderator: So, Andrew, 

Andrew Mwenda: he talks about… Germany lost the Second World War. So, whatever powers may have, the power of persuasion or power of the economy, once it was defeated in war, then it had to follow the dictates of the victors. 

Moderator: Okay. You spoke about peers, but in other, you know… …has, this transition has taken the form of, you know, peers of the sitting president. In our case, is that there are no more peers around President Museveni, and with people like Rwanda that you mentioned earlier, and former Prime Minister, another former Prime Minister, Prime Minister members being given a back seat, and you having the family members of President Museveni…, people like Kigongo are around. 

Moderator: So, how do you see peers versus family members of the president in this case? 

Andrew Mwenda: What’s the more likely.. In my own estimate, is that in the absence of Museveni, most people who have many things… Let me begin, there is the interest of… Leave the NRM members, there is the business community, there are the church leaders, the traditional institutions. The question most of the major players in Uganda would be asking themselves, how… what makes us safe? What best protects our interests? Who do we trust most? Because people are threatened. Change is a very threatening thing. People would want continuity, or they would not want the property confiscated, they would not want a civil war, so many things people would not want. And you have to look at the person they are likely to converge, and the person they are likely to converge around. So even the first family itself, it cannot rule on its own. If you are a member of the first family, you are Saleh or Muhoozi, Odrek, whoever you are, you will need a settlement, and that settlement requires that you have allies, you have on your side. So even members of the first family will have to reach out to traditional institutions, Mengo, all these kingdoms you see, they will have to reach out to the business community, they will have to reach out to the elders of the NRM, they will have to reach out to the church leaders, the mosque leaders, the religious leaders, because they are the powerful institutions through which Ugandans express themselves. So as a family, they can’t rule on their own. Whether they choose a family member or anyone else in the family, it does not negate the fact that they will need senior pillars of NRM on their side, senior leaders of the church, senior leaders of our traditional institutions, senior leaders of our business community, respected professionals. They have the upper hand. Yes, but in the end, the generals will support them precisely because they have won that respect and prestige. It’s not because people are… You get what I’m saying? The army will do rally behind them because it feels, or the top leadership of the army feels that the interests of the country, the interests of those leaders of the army are best served by the members of the first family. So it’s not that they will dictate and impose themselves on the country, no. They will have to build a coalition, a broad coalition behind them. Initially, we have the proponents of the army, but you can’t rule by force alone. You also have to use economic power. You also have to use soft power, which is the power to persuade. So they will have to extend their reach. They cannot say, oh, now that you have the army, all is sorted. Museveni has the army right now, but you see him sometimes meeting bad black, meeting full figure, meeting all these kinds of political actors and trying to win them over. He does that because he knows that the army is his instrument of last resort. Anything was escalated, then he has the final card. The quantity spent when you’re playing cards, he has that final, his nuclear option. But, he does not neglect his other options. Whether they are churches, Museveni will visit the Kabaka car, he will call on the cardinal, he will talk to the bishops, bribe them with the cars and other gifts. He donates a lot of money to the church. He’s not doing it out of charity. I think that a lot of it involves political calculation. 

Moderator: Okay. Okay, Andrew, I have one or two more questions for you before I bring in the audience. It seems our other panelist hasn’t been able to make it. So, President Museveni has his family members that he trusts, and, of course, you mentioned his son, who is the CDF, and his brother, who is the most senior member of the army in his absence. Now, there’s also his son-in-law, Odrek Rwabwogo. Why do you think it has become hard for Museveni to leave power for them before we reach the scenarios we are discussing now of when he’s dead? 

Andrew Mwenda: Well, I think that, again, as I told you, my own experience with these revolutionary movements, look at the characteristics. Always, the founding leader, we said, is the political head, the military commander, the political philosopher. He often dies in office. Fidel Castro retired when he was completely sick after 49 years in office. 49 years, that’s half a century. But most of them die in office, and when they die in office, power is then transferred. I do not envisage a situation of Museveni retiring and handing power to anyone. I am inclined to believe that the most likely scenario is that Museveni will have to die in office. Maybe that will be in 2044, when he’s 100. Remember, his dad lived to be 97. And when we were at the funeral, Museveni gave a speech. He said, you know, my old man, my father, used to be a chain smoker and a heavy drinker. If he did not have that kind of bad lifestyle, he would have lived longer. You could wonder, if the man is 97, Museveni wanted him to live to be what age? 150? So, and Museveni doesn’t drink alcohol, doesn’t smoke, is very careful with what he eats. He has obsessive concern with hygiene. He may live to be 100. In that case, we may still be with him for the next 20 years. Or Mugabe’s age of 90-something. So… 

Moderator: So, I don’t know… And if I heard you correctly, you think you’re inclined to believe he will die in power, right? 

Andrew Mwenda: Yes, yes, yes. I’m inclined to believe so. I don’t see how he can step aside and call his son, his brother-in-law, his daughter, Natasha, or anyone, or his brother, Saleh, and say, now take over. He doesn’t strike me as that kind of person. Remember that Museveni is not in power out of self-interest, as most people think. If that were the case, it would have been easier to negotiate him out of it. Museveni has a messianic belief in himself that he was sent by Providence to save Uganda and Africa. And people who are self-righteous are very difficult to deal with than people who are self-interested. If you meet a Fidel Castro Gaddafi who has that kind of messianic image of themselves, it is God who has sent them on Providence. And they are there to save. They are making a sacrifice to save the country. And they work 20 hours a day, and they clearly know I have forsaken my family, I have forsaken friends, all in the interest of doing this great thing that Providence sent me to do. How are you going to convince him to leave? Please, could you answer me that question, Agather? Because I feel like you are going to… But I am… Out of personal interest, no. I think more than personal interest… 

Moderator: I’m surprised that you think… I’m surprised that you think that someone staying in power because they think they are the only ones that can lead is not self-interest. 

Andrew Mwenda: I think it is. It’s selfishness. It’s that, you know, self-importance, that belief that you are the only one that can lead. Do you know the problem I have with you? Even you, you are a person so imbued with a sense of self-righteousness. It is impossible for you to believe that when you are acting… And you and Museveni are alike. In that sense that you are incapable of seeing that sometimes in pursuit of a self-righteous cause, then you are a fanatic. You cannot easily compromise. So, maybe that’s why you… You need to reflect on yourself before you criticize Museveni . I can tell you one of the reasons I’m very careful on this is because I have a lot of tendencies towards self-righteousness. I have a big weakness of often thinking that my cause is pure. 

Moderator: That you are the smartest person? Yes. That you are the smartest person in every room? 

Andrew Mwenda: Not necessarily. I have self-righteousness to think that my cause is the most virtuous and my pursuits are the most morally pure. So, because I’m so conscious of it, I’m always putting brakes on myself, restraining myself from my sense of self-righteousness. It’s a very uncompromising quality to have. 

Moderator: I want to take exception from you saying I am the same as president. Certainly, I have not held on to any power for 40 years. Regardless of what will happen of this country burning down when they die or when they can no longer hold the power. So, I don’t know where even that comparison comes from. 

Andrew Mwenda: I think you just want to take it as it is. You don’t need to be in power to be self-righteous. But, Pastor Martin Sempa is very self-righteous. He’s not in power. You can have self-righteousness in the media, as a journalist, as an analyst. You can have self-righteousness as a civil society activist. You can have self-righteousness in every sphere. If you are given the power like Museveni and you believe you have been sent by providence to save the country, you think without you the country will fall apart. 

Moderator: I have never believed I was sent by providence. Let’s leave me and I ask one last question and then I allow other people to engage. 

Andrew Mwenda: So, you see, you cannot even deal with criticism. Moderator: No, no. Actually, that’s not criticism. If you are saying that I believe the world will fall apart without me, that’s not a bad thing.

 Andrew Mwenda: No, no. That’s not what I’m saying. I’m simply saying you have such a fanatical belief in the correctness of your cause. You have a self-righteous attitude towards your work. And you think everybody is wrong and you are right. So, if you are given the power, you behave exactly like him because you are self-righteous. 

Moderator: That’s my point. Okay, so you are saying that and you know for me those the comparisons you make and a bit of what about it is in my eyes find it problematic. So you’re saying that the President, it is okay for President Museveni and it hold on to power and you is you know chaos of the highest proportions as you laid out here. 

Andrew Mwenda: No, that’s not what I’m saying. That’s not what I’m saying. That’s what you are saying. I am saying that the way I look at Museveni and how I have studied him over time, I feel like he has a highly exaggerated sense of self-righteousness. That his path is the correct one and that he’s a savior sent by providence and therefore he does not see power as a platform for privilege as you think. He sees him himself as making huge sacrifices for the country. I have told you if you listen to him, read his stuff, I abandoned my family, I was a vice president, I went to the bush, I lived in a grass-thatched hut, I suffered mosquitoes, I suffered all this to liberate this country and I can’t abandon that mission. I must keep pushing that mission. I think that’s what keeps him. Of course, I cannot rule out self-interest. I am sure power and the pomp gives him a particular sense of satisfaction and reward but I think that if his driving, the primary driving motive in him was selfishness, it would be easier for us to negotiate his exit because we could say you know we are going to give you a presidential jet, a hefty salary, a big mansion to retire. But those things, Museveni is not interested in them. Museveni, he can as well live simply and he lives a very simple life as long as he is convinced himself that he’s, you could say he’s deluded but I would say he’s convinced himself that he’s on a mission, a revolutionary mission to save Uganda, to save Africa, advance the cause of humanity. That I consider to be his biggest problem more than his selfishness. 

Moderator: There has been what seems as jostling for power in the first family. If what’s happening is to go by and the tweets that are sometimes deleted but also, yeah, we’ve seen this positioning and the rise of now Odrek Rwabwogo as the export trade expert and whatever and how that doesn’t sit well with Muhoozi Kainerugaba for example. This has been seen by many Ugandans as some other destabilizing factor of the fights we start in the first family. What’s your sense that you’re closer to them, you are not just an analyst here but you see things from a closer range than we do? 

Andrew Mwenda: I should put it this way. I think that the emergence of what you call a power struggle in the first family, I have not seen Muhoozi keenly struggling for power. In fact, me being close to him, I feel like his actions have been more responsive to the demands of his supporters rather than initiated by him. Not even seems, I know that. 

Moderator: What do supporters want to do? 

Andrew Mwenda: But you have asked me that I am near them. So you have asked me, I am giving you the fact of what I know. I know that Muhoozi never went out there to organize the MK movement. The MK movement started as a grassroots movement and it started by young people, and this is my own interpretation. Many young people want to see a change in government. They want to see a transition in power. And they recognize intuitively, perhaps not even consciously, but intuitively they recognize that removing Mr. Museveni from power through opposition politics is futile, but also costly. You will be beaten by the rain, burnt by the sand, tear-gassed by the police, brutalized by the… so many things happen to you. But because that path has not only failed and therefore proven to be futile, but it is also costly, it is better to, if you want a transition, it is better to rally behind Mr. Museveni’s son, because then you will not be brutalized by the police. You will not be tear-gassed, you will not be disturbed. So I feel people made a strategic choice. And many supporters of Museveni who want to see a transition, many in the opposition who want a transition, came to rally around the MK movement in order to get a transition from this very old man, whom they feel they can’t connect to. And Muhozi responded positively to his supporters with the most minimum effort he could do. I have not seen him invest a lot of his time in trying to run around the country and mobilize support. If Muhozi invested 2% of his time or 10% in promoting his candidature. My friend, this country will be on fire. It isn’t because he has been a reluctant leader of this movement. And I’ve explained to you why I think this movement started. Yes. Now, regarding Odrek Rwabwogo, I have not talked to him. I see he has people online who are always arguing with his case. But he hasn’t told me that he’s interested in the presidency. I imagine he’s ambitious. And the reason this comes about is that I think the NRM’s organizational strength initially depended on the strength of its opponents. As long as an outside opponent was very, very strong and threatening it, then it was able to cohere inside and organize itself. But because there has been a steady erosion of opposition politics, because of disappointment of them not winning elections, because of many of them getting bribed, others being brutalized, the opposition in Uganda is in disarray. In the absence of internal opposition in the NRM, which has systematically been purged through the exit of the Mushega’s, the Muntus, the Miria matembes, up recently until Amama mbabazi, the NRM has been purged of any form of opposition. The external opposition, UPC, DP, now NUP and FDC have been obliterated. Then conflict and contestation for power will shift into the family. In fact, I think that Museveni has put himself at a disadvantage with the opposition inside the NRM and outside of it. Now he’s confronting power struggles inside his own house. And it is going to be difficult for him to manage this part, because there he cannot act dispassionately, because if these are your family members, your feelings and emotions may cloud your judgment. I actually think he must be in a very difficult situation. Assuming a conflict was to arise between Odrek Rwabwogo and Natasha Karugyire in the contest for the presidency, how does he referee such a contest? And I think that this was an inevitable result of his success at stifling opposition inside the NRM and outside of it. 

Moderator: Well, first I wouldn’t call… You have just said that people, because they know it’s too much, it’s costly to be in the opposition. I wouldn’t call people that converge behind me, because they know they will not be brutalized by police supporters, right? I wouldn’t. I would call them opportunists, like his father called them, but not supporters. I don’t know how you see it as someone who was in PLU Andrew Mwenda: Well, I would put it this way. Maybe I should amend my statement to say that people join a candidate for different reasons. There are many people who admire Muhoozi because of his military exploits, many because of his track record. He has been the most honest public servant you can imagine in Uganda, never been involved in any kind of scandal. Then he’s the son of the president, and that has given him a lot of profile. So he has fans and admirers purely on the basis of his personality, his accomplishments, and the integrity of his character. Then, there are many others who want to see a transition. Hold a second, Agather. There are many people in Uganda who want to see a transition, many people who support Besigye or Bobi Wine never went there because many people wanted to get rid of Museveni , and often they look for a candidate with the best chance of defeating Museveni. Realize that in Uganda, presidential elections, we are failed to get a strong third party candidate. Why? It’s because people do not go into the race, really, to vote candidates. It is either to vote for Museveni or to vote against him. So, when Museveni came, he got 1.5 percent. You can bring any candidate in Uganda, the opposition vote will tend to rally upon the person likely to defeat Museveni . So, it should not surprise you, therefore, that… Are you saying those are not Bobi Wine supporters? People may support you for different reasons. Those reasons may not be because they admire your nose, but because you are the best bet for them to get what they want. So we support candidates for different reasons. Most people do support Museveni because he is a self-catered support with better chances of achieving a transition without having to have Museveni stand in your way. And I find that really strategically brilliant. 

Moderator: Andrew questions keep coming from your answers but this one. Let me ask before we go to the audience. You talked about President Museveni’s self-righteousness, the severe mentality. But when President Museveni came to power, the first thing he said was that the problem of Africa is leaders who cling on to power. The first thing he said was that he was going to transfer power to civilian rule. The other thing he said was that he’s going to put in place a constitution that will make people, that will have presidential term limits. At what point did he just develop a severe mentality?

Andrew Mwenda: Well, I think that… For becoming self-righteous, yes. You cannot look at a person in such an individual way, in one line, in one speech, because we also have a lot of evidence. You should ask leaders. One time, Museveni came from abroad in 1987 and reached the airport at the VIP lounge. Before he addressed the press, he talked to the generals. I think this story, we haven’t even done it in a month in those days. And he said, you guys are just there in wherever doing businesses and stuff like that. You do not know how to hold power. If you want to hold power, the president said, you need to have effective control over the infrastructure. You have to have access to money, and that money in order to buy powerful elites, but also to ensure that you are able to provide social welfare programs to the masses. And he was telling these NRM leaders of the high command and the political world that NRM was going to be here for 50 years. So whatever he was saying in public and whatever he was saying in private, you can see they are different. Although I also think, Agather, that Museveni may not have had a long-term plan to hold power for the last 40 years. Maybe he never envisaged him that way. Maybe, like you, initially he thought he could be there for four years or five years and he leaves. But his sense of self-righteousness and his sense of mission and purpose has always kept him postponing that decision, thinking I’m still needed, I’m still needed. So it’s possible that his long stay in power has been contingent on circumstances, but he has postponed his exit for the last 38 years precisely because he sees himself as the only guy capable of doing the job. All of us are just incompetent, misguided ideologically. 

Moderator: I heard you added, like me again, as if there’s any position I’ve held on to for 38 years, but I’m not going to dwell on that. Let me bring in the audience.

This is an X space from Agora Discourse with me Agather Atuhaire: Transition Question: A conversation with Andrew Mwenda and transcribed by Henry Otafiire. This material may be protected by copyright