Dan April 3, 2025

CHARLES ONYANGO OBBO

Godwin Toko: Patrick, confirm that you can hear me?

Patrick: Yeah.

Godwin Toko: And I request that you make Agatha the co-host and you make Charles the speaker. So that, um—it’s the other way around, eh? Just make Charles the speaker and then Agather the co-host. I see she’s already here. Yeah, so for those who have just joined us, we are happy to have you here. Today, we are going to have a conversation with the celebrated journalist, um, Charles Onyango Obbo. I know this is not a new name to most of you, whether it be on the streets of Twitter, Daily Monitor, The East African. Um, the tremendous work he has done, especially in journalism—the writings and all that—are out there for everyone to see. So we are going to have a conversation with him on a question that we’ve had discussions on with quite a number of people now. This is the sixth edition. Just to remind you, we’ve had one with Andrew Mwenda—quite a journalist. We had one with, um, General Mugisha Muntu, the former army commander and presidential aspirant, and the head—they call him, I think, the national mobilizer for the Alliance for National Transformation. We had one with Salamu Musumba. We had one with Daudi Mpanga. And then last week, we had one with Yusuf Serunkuma, the academic.

And like I said last week, this is something that we’re taking very seriously. You may want to stay longer for these conversations because we’re trying to have people like the celebrated former minister of Museveni, feminist, politician, elder, and so many things—Miria Matembe—and people along those lines.

So we shall be asking each of them the same question: what their view is on Uganda’s transition and how that can play out.

Again, Patrick, kindly make—ah, I see Charles is now a speaker.

So, I’ll just be waiting for Agather in a few minutes, and then we can get the conversation underway.

Now, how we structure these conversations is that they are broken into segments. The first segment will involve a question-and-answer session with the guest. That runs for about an hour and a half. Then after that segment, we’ll bring in the audience, where any of you can participate—be it through a question, a comment, um, whichever way you want to participate, as long as you do it within the time stipulated so that many other people can also contribute. That segment will come later.

Occasionally, we also have other spaces about issues happening in the country. We didn’t have one this week, but we’re also running a campaign on Uganda’s prisons. And, uh, the litmus test is really showing a lot of negative signs. Our prisons seem to be the third most crowded in the world, after the Republic of Congo and Cambodia, with as much as 360-plus percent overcrowding.

Prison cells built for as few as 25 people are now holding as many as 190-something people. Those are very grim statistics. Now, for that conversation, we are likely to have a space of this nature next week on Tuesday. You may want to look out for that.

So, Patrick, I see Agather is back. Can you make her a speaker so that she can start us off with the conversation? I see Charles is already a speaker. Maybe I could just engage Charles on his microphone.

Godwin Toko: Good evening, Charles. Can you hear me?

Onyango Obbo: Yes, I can.

Godwin Toko: Great. We are really glad to have you, and we look forward to a very, very insightful speech and conversation with you today.

Onyango Obbo: Oh, uh, don’t bank on it, but…

Godwin Toko: No, there—there are risks you take with a lot of confidence, and that’s one of the risks I’m willing to take with a lot of confidence today.

Okay, so I see Agather is here. Agather, please, you could start us off if you’re ready.

Agather: Hi, um, I was thinking we give like three minutes for people to join in. Let me send—let me send the link to people that have asked for it. Then we start at, um, five minutes past.

You can play for us your not-very-nice reggae music in the meantime.

Godwin Toko: Okay, let me look for one that—uh, let me look for one that is not so bad, yo. Hope I find one.

Agather: Okay.

Godwin Toko: Hi. Yes, we can start.

Agather: Good evening, listeners. Good evening, Charles. Thank you for being with us. I know that we had to really, really sort of coerce you. Thank you for finally agreeing to be with us on this space. I don’t know—do you want to first greet the listeners, and then we start? Charles, can you hear me?

Godwin: His microphone is muted. I don’t know… just in case he’s speaking.

Agather: Hi, so as we’re getting started—our guest has already been introduced by Godwin Toko. He’s a veteran journalist who has been around in journalism for as long as the NRA man, President Museveni, has also been around. We thought that we need to hear from people like him—people who have been here long enough—about the prospects of transition in this country.

How does it look? What is at stake, or what do they think is at stake? But also, how has the NRA government under President Museveni evolved, as they have seen it?

So, let’s confirm if Charles is with us and if he can hear us.

Agather: Charles?

Godwin: Maybe we just have to reach out to him. I see his microphone is still muted.

Okay, as Agather reaches out to Charles—for those who just joined us, I’ll have to remind you that this is the sixth of a series of similar conversations we’ve had about the transition question in Uganda right now.

Of course, for those who may not be aware—perhaps those who are not from Uganda—we’ve had the same president since 1986. On Sunday this week, that president will mark 39 years in power—uninterrupted.

Thirty-nine years in power, the same political party. I think about 80% of Ugandans now were born after he became president. So, it’s really a big percentage of the country that knows only one president.

But of course, this president has defied so many things. A lot of political norms have been defied. Not many gave him a chance to stay in power for this long. But one thing he almost certainly cannot defy is biology. Now, he doesn’t seem to have the energy he had back then. And of course, like every human being, that raises some questions:

Where does Uganda go from here?

We’ve seen African countries that had very, very strong and powerful leaders in the past. Whether you talk of our neighbor just one country away—Sudan—whether it be Kenya in the 80s and 90s, whether it be Libya, Zimbabwe under Mugabe… Eventually, there comes a time when there has to be a shift—a movement away from that particular president.

And if you look at it critically, some of those cases have ended badly.

Yes, Charles, you’re here now?

Godwin: Charles, I see your microphone was briefly unmuted, and then it got muted again. Okay, yeah, so I was saying—if you look at many of these countries, sometimes things can easily go south. Sudan is now in a full-fledged civil war. I just noticed that in the apartment where I stay, probably now there are more Sudanese neighbors than there were at this time last year. That’s how quickly things can change.

Libya is also a nation that is completely messed up. Kenya somehow survived that trap—it has its own problems, but at least it didn’t have a very serious breakdown after the Moi era. Zimbabwe, however, seems to have moved from one bad place to another bad place.

So now, the question becomes: How does Uganda navigate this? How do we move past the current president but also ensure that, like Kenya, we don’t end up where Sudan is, or where Libya is, or even where Zimbabwe is under Mnangagwa?

These are the questions we’ve been asking.

So far, we’ve had five different people weigh in on this discussion. And for those who may not have tuned in, each of those conversations was recorded. If you search the Agora Twitter handle, you can find a link to each of those discussions and listen at your own time.

The very first conversation we had was with another journalist—Andrew Mwenda. Then we had one with lawyer Daudi Mpanga. Then we had another with Salam Musumba, a respected politician in her own right, a former Member of Parliament, and so many other things. Then we spoke with General Mugisha Muntu, who led the army at the age of 27, and who is now a presidential candidate.

I think I just have to send Charles an invitation to speak—I see he has dropped off as a speaker.

Okay, I think he’ll get back on. I’ve sent him a message, but he hasn’t responded yet, so I can give him a call and see what’s up.

Godwin: Please do that. I see he has actually entirely dropped off the space.

Agather: Oh yes, I can see that on my side.

Godwin: Okay, because he turned into a listener, and then he was off. Just check with him.

Agather: Okay.

Godwin: Yeah, so like I was saying, Uganda has this history. And perhaps that’s why we’re having these conversations.We’ve had Yusuf Serunkuma, Andrew Mwenda, Daudi Mpanga, Salam Musumba, and General Mugisha Muntu. So, this is the sixth conversation. The good thing is, each of these conversations is recorded. That means you can listen to them at your own convenient time and hear what each of these guests had to say. And we pledge that this is not going to be the last one. God willing, as long as we have life, as long as we are all here, and as long as what happened in Sudan last night—where social media has been banned entirely for three months—doesn’t happen here, we’ll have another conversation.Hopefully next week, we’ll invite another elder—someone who has been here, seen it, lived through it—and they’ll share their perspective on how Uganda can transition from one president to another while avoiding the turmoil that Sudan, Zimbabwe, and Libya have experienced.

Yes, and we also hold regular conversations on other issues. Like I mentioned earlier, we are likely to have a panel on Uganda’s prisons next week on Tuesday. We are putting together a panel—including someone from the prison system—

Agather: Hi, so I’m still trying to get hold of Charles. He says he got kicked out and can’t join again

Onyango Obbo: I’m Charles Onyango Obbo. I’m a Ugandan journalist and writer, and I’m based in Nairobi.

Godwin: Is that enough?

Onyango Obbo: Yeah, that can do.

Godwin: Like I said, I don’t think that’s a formality. Not many people here don’t know who you are, really.

Onyango Obbo: Yes, and I’ve known you for a long time.

Godwin: Yeah, yeah, yeah. Quite a long time.

So, I’m going to start with the first question. You’ve lived through this—probably the entire NRM regime. Yeah. If I could just ask you, what has changed? If you look at the NRM, could you give us a picture? I mean, I was born several years into the NRM reign. From the time it started to where we are now, what has changed? First, within the NRM, and then, what has changed about Uganda in the time that NRM has been in charge?

Onyango Obbo: Well, as Mahmood Mamdani says, the NRM phenomenon was a very, very consequential historical event in Uganda. And I think we need to recognize that from the outset. When it came to power, it was really a catch-all movement. It represented many things to many people. It was a progressive movement. It also had a very traditionalist and conservative core. And to many, it represented hope.

But it was also a bit of a problem because, at that point, there was a Southern hegemonic element to it. So, you know, certain parts of the country—particularly the Northwest—I think West Nile was different—were very uncertain about it. They were fearful. But fundamentally, the NRM was able to solve, at least for the South and East, major issues of security. It built the economy. It brought a sense of national pride. I’ll give you an example. I remember around 1991, I was traveling in Southern Africa. I went from Malawi to Zimbabwe. When I presented my passport at immigration, the officer saw that it was a Ugandan passport. He just held me for several minutes, asking me to tell him the Ugandan story. A queue was forming, but he was so engrossed in hearing about Uganda. Then he realized the queue was too long, so he handed me back my passport and told me to go. I reminded him that he hadn’t stamped it, and I would have problems. Then he stamped it and let me go. That just shows you what the NRM phenomenon was in the early years—not just in Uganda but in the region and across Africa.

But then something happened. Certain shifts occurred—either by design or as unintended consequences. Slowly, the NRM—or more precisely, the civilian presidency of the Ugandan state—changed into a feudal state. Now, what are the elements of a feudal state? In a feudal state, the household is not just a family; it becomes a political unit. The lords, their wives, sons, daughters, and extended family members all play roles in governance—whether in administration, the judiciary, the economy, or the military. The family estate becomes the center of power. The NRM does not see itself this way. But in reality, structurally, it has become a feudal state. And really, everything that has happened since then stems from that fundamental structural change. Thank you.

Godwin: At this point, the NRM turning from what you described earlier into a feudal state—if you could pinpoint a moment, when did that shift happen?

Onyango Obbo: In many ways, I think it started happening around 1994 when the process for making the new constitution began. There had to be several political realignments, and the war in the north also produced a very strange dynamic.

There was a fear—the fear of the return of northern rule. Remember, Alice Lakwena and her Holy Spirit Movement had advanced as far as Kapeeka. That specter of what was called “northern rule” in the south created a very reactionary form of politics. Within the more conservative and reactionary wing of the NRM—at that time still the NRA—there were discussions about Uganda “ending at the Karuma line” and other exclusionary ideas. So, the response to the northern threat, first represented by Lakwena and later by Joseph Kony, bred a very reactionary and unpleasant form of politics.

Godwin: Okay, Patrick, please make Agather co-host in the meantime. Now, we have a scenario where the president has been in power for close to four decades—on Sunday, it will be 39 years. For context, in Africa, there are only three presidents currently in office who have led longer than that: Obiang of Equatorial Guinea, Biya of Cameroon, and Nguesso of the Republic of Congo. When President Museveni took over, he made speeches about fundamental change. Looking back, at any point, did you see signs that pointed to where we are now? A president ruling for this long and backtracking on so many of the things he promised at the beginning?

Onyango Obbo: Yes. At the end of February, a new book by Mahmood Mamdani on Uganda will be published. I don’t think there has ever been a book like it, and probably never will be again. I think people should look forward to it as it explores this phenomenon in depth. There were two things. First, Museveni had a certain messianic element to him. That was always clear. And when someone comes as a messiah, there is always a greater risk that the story ends where we are now rather than with a more glorious political transition.  Secondly, there has been a long-standing critique of Uganda’s political evolution. Yash Tandon, around 1988, wrote an important book that examined Uganda’s history—covering the UNLF, the UPM, FRONASA, and all those movements.

He argued that we were in a period of continuity rather than a break from the past. His analysis was compelling.Interestingly, the Tanzanians—who Museveni admired in the 1970s—always had the view that he would turn out to be a “tribal chief,” in their words.

At the time, in the late 1980s and 1990s, that was difficult to believe. But looking back, their reading was probably much more accurate.

Godwin: Okay, Agather, you’re going to come in. Can I just ask a follow-up before you pick it up? So, the other thing—following up on that, Charles—we are now a nation of about 45 million people. Back then, we were maybe 14 or 16 million. Uganda has so many tribes and conflicting realities. Before Museveni, presidents lasted six months or just a few years. Yet, he has cracked the code and ruled longer than all his predecessors combined. What made Museveni different? What allowed him to hold power for this long in a country where no leader before him had managed such longevity?

Onyango Obbo: There are really three things. First, historically, we have seen in Africa and elsewhere that leaders who come to power at the head of a liberation movement tend to stay in power for a very long time. The reason is that it takes an extraordinary level of political talent to get people to accept dying for you. And I think many of Museveni’s critics underestimate that about him. The second thing is that Museveni is an incredibly talented strategic thinker. If you watch him and talk to people close to him, Museveni never fights today’s battles today. The things he’s doing today, he laid the groundwork for those battles five years ago. So, he is always significantly ahead of his adversaries.

In many ways, that was the premium he brought to the bush war. It wasn’t so much about his bravery, but rather his strategic thinking.

Also, if you look at Ugandan society, since 1966, at any given time, a part of Uganda has been going through a traumatic experience. If you step back and look at the bigger picture, Uganda has lived under extreme violence or repression for nearly 60 years. The people’s spirit is really broken. It might not always be obvious, but beneath the surface, people are exhausted. Sixty years is a long time. And to a leader who understands this, people are quicker to settle for small things—like peace, the ability to grow potatoes and sell them in the marketplace. After decades of trauma, people are more willing to bargain at a very low price for stability.

Godwin: Agather, you can pick it up from there.

Agather: Okay, thank you, Godwin. Thank you, Charles. I think I got lost trying to find my way back into the space. But yes, this discussion is important. By the way, today is my birthday. I didn’t plan to be working at 7 p.m., but here we are.So, I am 37 years old today. My mother got pregnant with me more than a year after Museveni came to power. Now, I have a son who will be sitting for P7 this year. In all that time, my generation was born and has now produced our own children—all while living under the same government. Right now, you can see how that reality is agitating people. During the 2017 debate on removing the age limit, your friend—or maybe your mentee—argued that age was not the issue, citing examples of Italian and American leaders. But I don’t think Ugandans’ problem is age. It’s the fact that, for the first time, we want to move from one president to another without bloodshed, without conflict, without war. The framers of the 1995 Constitution thought they had put safeguards in place. But now, those safeguards are gone. What do you think about that? And what next?

Onyango Obbo: First, I agree with Mwende. The problem with Uganda’s political situation today is not Museveni’s age. It is his political longevity. Even if he were 45 or 60 today, the same issues would still apply. Secondly, if you look at the 1995 Constitution, it did not actually put any real safeguards. You can mention term limits and the age limit, but those were just constraints on executive power. They were not a transition mechanism. Real transitions usually happen outside of legal frameworks—within political parties, political culture, and unwritten norms. Some countries write these into their constitutions, but Uganda did not. Now, how do we avoid a bloody transition?

Many people accuse Museveni of trying to create a dynasty—of wanting to hand power to his son, Muhoozi Kainerugaba.Muhoozi, like any Ugandan, has the right to run for president, as long as he is not privileged over others. But Museveni is very aware of these things. He is trying to manage the transition, even if many disagree with his approach. And remember, Museveni never relies on just one option. He always has multiple strategies in play. If you talk to different people, you will find that he has at least three or four potential succession plans. The one around Muhoozi gets the most public attention, but I don’t think it’s the most important one. Museveni has never been the kind of leader to stake everything on just one plan. So, the real question is: which of his plans will succeed?

Agather: Okay, so let’s talk about Museveni’s ideas. Are we a nation simply at the mercy of Museveni’s ideas? Are his ideas aligned with the interests of Ugandans? Or is there something Ugandans can do instead of waiting on Museveni?

Onyango Obbo: There are a lot of small groups which are working on this. I think that the way these things are happening, they can’t be linear. If you take, for example, the transition in Kenya in 2002, it was complex and messy and, you know, I mean, in the run-up to the election, it was not scripted, you know, a lot of pieces just fall together, and I think that that is what the, you know, the Ugandan situation will be.

Now, whether it is in Uganda’s interest or not, I think that for, you know, the—I mean, if you think of it, Museveni doesn’t really have a responsibility to do the big thing in Ugandan interest at this point. So it is only to be expected that he would pursue a line which is very narrowly in his interest and, secondly, you know, that of, you know, the NRM. So, you know, it’s—as a country, we shouldn’t invest any currency in the question of whether Museveni will do something good for the country. Politicians don’t behave like that around these, you know, transition issues. Usually, those forces come from the outside, that they push them in certain directions, are able to input into the process. So, for example, in the case of Moi, if it was not the, you know, people like Saleh Kosgei, who were, you know, who are, you know—who was kind of a PS, a powerful PS, and close to him—if it was not certain religious leaders who were, you know, very close to him, you know, the story of this country would have been different. So it’s the combination of those internal actors within his party, in his court, together with the pressure of the democracy movement that then produced change. And I think that that is likely where Uganda will go. But I think that a script—a Museveni script in the big Ugandan interest that then, you know, delivers us, you know, to the promised land—I think that is unlikely to happen.

Agather: Okay, so many people that we have interacted with thought they had seen him as a liberator when he and his NRM came to power in 1986, and that he had so much goodwill, and that they had thought the Ten Point Program and everything that was on it would be implemented to the core. You have had run-ins with this government, and by run-ins I mean you have court cases in the early 1990s about freedom of expression, so to speak. How do you think President Museveni’s era has evolved? Was it any better at any point, or was it the same, but people were not yet maybe open to what was going on?

Onyango Obbo:
You know, I take a very sanguine view of the battles that we had, because, you know, from my side I always expected that the state would fight back, so that the things, you know, that we got into the trouble that we did—I think it would have been a greater surprise to me if we didn’t. So, you know, it’s just the nature of the beast. That, uh, that they will do that, but, uh, you know, um, it’s—it’s because in the early years, um, you know, uh, Museveni and NRM were—were so dominant. It’s—it’s—it seems ironic. I mean, despite those issues that we had, it was really a fairly good time, you know, for—for media. There was a lot more space for critical journalism because at that time, when you didn’t have an opposition, the—the state, the NRM state, needed an independent media.

And at that time, the argument was that we don’t need an opposition because the work that is done, uh, by the opposition, and the proof that Uganda is—is—is actually a multi-party society, is that it has many voices. And the minimum, you know—and that is most evident in the fact that you have a free press. So there was a certain system—a system, um, both cynical and, you know, big—big picture, uh, strategic necessity—to have a free press. So it was actually a good period.And—and then, I think, when, uh, particularly—and—and this is the thing—when Kizza Besigye contested, uh, against him in 2001, I mean, we—everything just blew up. That changed everything.

So, uh, so, you know, I say that—so I said in 1994 we started seeing the change. We went through a very glorious period between 1996 and around 1999. Those were incredible three years. And—and, you know, then the Besigye thing came and has never, uh—I mean, it’s been downward from, uh, you know, from there on.

Agather: So, you—you are saying that, um, even—even if you had those issues, uh, when you were at the Daily Monitor, the space was much better than it is now? And—and freedom of expression was more respected than—than now?

Onyango Obbo: Yeah, yeah, yeah. You know, you know, Museveni would come—he would come even to the Capital Gang and he would engage in intellectual combat. So—so—so it’s—it’s, uh, and—and he—he was—he was very confident in, uh, in his, uh, in his political scheme. And, uh, they—they, you know—and I think, you know, the external threat—there was one time Museveni went to, uh—I don’t know, do they call it that area called Muzik? I don’t know what it’s called these days, somewhere along that road. And—and, you know, he couldn’t—he had to—he couldn’t drive through. So he had to abandon his car and basically couldn’t walk through the crowd. You know, the people demanded to carry him. Can you imagine today? Today, for him to go to that part of the city, he would need a brigade.

Agather: What do you think has changed?

Onyango Obbo: 
It’s—it’s, uh, you know, I think, you know, people really feel let down. Um, you know, that kind of—kind of the NRM concessions has broken down. Um, you know, the—you know, the goodies that, uh, that the people were getting—they are no longer getting. And like I said earlier, you know, it became—it has become a very narrow feudal, um, state. And so, you know, people feel excluded. They feel used and abused. And, you know, then, you know, the particular issues in Buganda then become much more complicated. So there is—there’s a bit of that, um, how the Buganda project blew up. So I think those just make it, um, you know, have just changed his political standing.

Agather: 
Okay. So—so earlier—earlier on, you—you said, um, you alluded to what happened in Kenya in 2002. And you said that’s most likely its going to happen in the case of Uganda, right?

Onyango Obbo:
Yeah.

Agather: Do you think that the circumstances or maybe that—that pushed Moi to make such concessions are prevalent here or will be at some point in the near future?

Onyango Obbo: Um, yes. And, you know, you have to look—because precisely because of the longevity of Museveni’s rule, there are very, very many people—there are very, very many people, you know, who have done very well after it. And they are—when they come to a point where they have to recognize that, for biological reasons, Museveni won’t be there, they as, you know, property—you know, capitalists and property owners—are very, very pragmatic and, you know, smart people.

So, I think that we will see those elements coalescing together. I get people who share with me some of the conversations that take place in WhatsApp groups in Uganda. And, you know, I have recently looked at two conversations of what you say are the WhatsApp conversations of people who have benefited from the political order. And it’s unbelievable. It’s unbelievable, the conversation going there. They do actually—are confronting these issues in a very, very direct way. And even some of them were saying, you know, some of these things that are being done in Uganda, you know, it can’t be done in our name. So, outwardly, you know, it might look bleak. But I think that the people who have done very well from this order—they are practical men and women, and with self-interest, you know, with rational self-interest. I think that we will begin to see those kinds of movements and, you know, coalescing with other forces and, you know, I think come—you know, attempt to craft, you know, a sensible, you know, transition. I don’t want to bank on it completely. It could go terribly wrong. Because, like I think Toko said at the—you know, at the start, there is the other part of the equation. If you look at it, it’s very difficult to see how Uganda holds together as a single state after Museveni. Because can anyone really ever have the kind of initial foundational credibility that he had when he came to power to keep this project together?

Will any figure ever be able to even articulate the kind of vision which he articulated in the beginning? Probably no. Is there any part of Uganda that is going to accept, even in purely, you know, sectarian and ethnic terms, that someone from that kind of vision which he articulated in the beginning—probably no. Is there any part of Uganda that’s going to accept, even in purely, you know, sectarian and ethnic terms, that someone from another region should be their president and they trust that it will end well for them? Probably no.

So, if you look at it that way, the option then seems—look, you know, either Uganda breaks up, or the person who holds it together will have to murder half of the country to keep it together. You know, so—so that looks very bleak, but it is also a real possibility. So, you have a competition for these various scenarios for how the story ends.

Agather: I see you and Toko agreeing with him that he’s the only visionary among the 45 million people, right?

Onyango Obbo: No, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no. I didn’t say he was the only one. Yeah, uh, the—you know, um—you know, let me tell you a little story. When, um—after the December 1980 elections were stolen—I know my friend Andrew doesn’t think so, he doesn’t believe they were stolen, but they were—uh, there was, uh, you know, there was a meeting at, um, Kintu Musoke house in Lungujja, you know, just down below the hill. And so, there were all these UPM people, you know, UPM people, the Bidandi’s, the Chango Machos—all these guys, they were all there. So, so, they were discussing what would happen now that, uh, this election had been, uh, stolen. And—and so, they spent the whole night discussing. And also, there were all these scenarios: we go, we work with the people, quietly mobilize, um, create, you know, political cells—a very, very Marxist kind of approach. And—and that was the dominant, uh, point of view—that people disperse and create, uh, political communities organized on several fronts.

Now, Museveni sits through all of this and says nothing. He’s mostly listening, very politely. So, in the morning, they are leaving, and if you go to Kintu Musoke’s house, they have long stairs coming down like so. He’s—he’s one of the first people to walk down. And when he gets to the bottom of the stairs, he turns to the rest of the guys and tells them:

“You know what, you guys? If you want, you can go and mobilize. Me, I’m not going to sit around and let Obote arrest me.”

So—and that’s something he could have told the rest of the people, um, but—but he didn’t. Now, um, I’ve—I’ve had conversations with many of these people, including many times with Bidandi Ssali and Kintu Musoke.

What do they think of it? And Kintu Musoke told me, “You know, Charles, he won. Eventually, all of us came, and, you know, we had to rally around the project that he created. But he defined us. And he won.” So, it’s—it’s, uh, he’s—uh, there are—there are many people who are visionaries in Uganda. I mean, they—they—there’s no shortage of them. But the reality is that he’s the one that won power. You can’t take that away.

Agather: I hear you. So—so—so, Charles, you’re talking about biology and all, um, what—what if President Museveni died in power? Just because, you know, he wants to run again, uh, in, um, the race next year, and then he is 82, 83—so as people grow older, of course, um, the chances of, um, of dying are higher. If President Museveni died in power, what would happen? What do you think would happen? The—like, the scenarios now?

Onyango Obbo: Okay. I—I—I, um, you know, I—I, uh—I, uh—you know, I’m gonna display a little bit of teenage naivety here. But, uh—but I do actually think that what happens next will be—this will be determined by the UPDF. And—and the UPDF mainstream. Because I think there tends to be a lot of focus on, uh, um, you know—you know, the—you know, the UPDF element around—around and things like that. But, uh, you know, the thing is, is that this is actually a very, very progressive element within, you know, a very nationalist and broad element within, you know, the—you know, the UPDF. It’s not the most visible. It is probably not even the most dominant. But it is largely committed to some of the trappings of the constitution that are left—of some form of, of, um, you know, respectable, mainstream type of, uh, you know, transition. Um, you know, many of them do, uh, think that, you know—you know, the Ugandan project should be much more, you know, inclusive. And I still think that, whereas most people are not focused there, I think that we immediately see that element coming before. If there is, uh—God forbid—something abruptly happens to Museveni, and, you know, he doesn’t wake up at all…

Agather:
So this is you being pragmatic because we have a constitution that says otherwise.

Onyango Obbo:Yeah, no, no, no. You know, it won’t happen, you know, because there will be such a great sense of crisis, you know. And, you know, some people will be running for the hills—people who are very insecure. So we will have a breakdown. But I think that there will also be that element who will then say, “No, no, no, no, you know, there are some kind of rules that we have. There is a certain kind of logic to how power should be organized in Uganda. Can we craft something?” And I think that, you know, the UPDF will have, you know, the most important say in that settlement.

Agather:
Okay, so I was going to say—that means we’ve become a full-blown military state?

Onyango Obbo: Not necessarily, you know, because Uganda is very—it’s, the way power is, we will always have a civilian-military consortium. Let me put it that way. I don’t think that we will go to a very traditional military state unless that transition happens via a coup. And I don’t know, you know, how many people think that that is a real possibility in the Ugandan context. I don’t see it happening, you know, in the short term. So I think as long as it doesn’t happen that way, I think we’ll have some civilian-military consortium with, you know, some authoritarian elements to it, but also with some semi-democratic elements tucked in the corner somewhere there.

Agather: Okay, so now, Charles—the Western powers have always, I mean, the Europeans and the Americans have always played a big role in many changes of government in Africa.
Even with President Museveni, of course, coming to power, he got a lot of support from them. But also, his era has been backed by these powers for a long time. Do you think they can or will play any role in us transitioning from President Museveni to another leader?

Onyango Obbo: I am aware of a couple of—two, three, four—efforts which, you know, the diplomatic community, some of the, you know, the global powers that you speak of, are involved in around the Ugandan transition. They don’t seem to have picked up a lot of steam. And also, generally, what we are seeing everywhere is that there is—I mean, admittedly—a decline of those, you know, interventionist powers in African and Ugandan politics. So I think that their ability to determine, you know, the final shape of how the Ugandan transition looks—I think it has diminished considerably. But they might be very important after it has happened in terms of bringing diplomatic support and resources around the new regime and the new leadership. So that they have the resources to buy themselves political credibility, to offer the country social bribes and legitimize themselves. I see them playing a role in that sense. But I think in terms of the very strict area of who gets to sit at the table and those kinds of things—their ability to do so has diminished considerably.

Agather: I see Godwin has a question.

Godwin: Okay, so I’m going to ask…The demographic shift in Uganda—to the point that today, probably 80% or even more of Ugandans were born at the time of Museveni—how does that affect, how does that play out in the post-Museveni era? You have people who have had fears from the 1960s, how their communities have been affected. But so many Ugandans have grown up without that. They’ve not had—apart from reading in books—cases of what Amin did. Many are naive and even dispute it. There are so many Gen Zs and younger people here saying that Amin was probably better—never mind that they didn’t live through that. So how does that generally play out in the aftermath of Museveni’s presidency in Uganda?

Onyango Obbo: You know, actually, very literal. And, you know, because—let me tell you—if you look at youth politics, it goes back to the question of, you know, Museveni’s age.
I don’t think that age alone can be the basis on which you organize politics. In other words, you have to infuse some problematic and ideological elements. So the question then becomes: What do these young people represent? What do they want? What can they do? And unfortunately, you know, by and large—and this is not just Ugandans, this is all over the world, you know, as the recent U.S. election shows—many young people are really fairly conservative and even reactionary in their politics. So, you know, they might have the age, but they’re not incredibly progressive. And I think that, you know, in that sense, it has limited their ability to influence, you know, the political path of the country.

And it’s really played into Museveni’s hand. And even he knows this very well. Remember, you know, was it two years ago when he talked about young people throwing their legs up in the night? You know, you should leave them the freedom to do that.

And I think he understands that. So my own sense is that, yes, there are those demographic realities, but they are not politically potent yet. I mean, we do recognize—and people talk a lot about—these young people, this demographic youth, but, you know, it really will not amount to much until they craft an idea of the kind of society they want and organize around it, you know, in a broad national sort of way.

Ends.